## 2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is per dog? We saw above that one possible response puro Chrysippus’ paradox was onesto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not per dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is a dog, then, given the standard account of identity, there are two dogs where we https://datingranking.net/it/vietnamcupid-review/ would normally count only one. In fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is per proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus a hair – which is just as much verso dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply to avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar alone. But the maximality principle may seem preciso be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark con unison? If a thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be capable of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested per reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (in various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and durante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is a Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still durante place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later onesto become definitely Dalmatians; some per a day, some per verso second, or a split second. It seems arbitrary sicuro proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is per split second away from becoming definitely a Dalmatian, a Dalmatian, while denying that one a day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems sicuro favor one of the latter type according to which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Mediante any case, the canone account of identity seems unable on its own preciso handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus per hair is per dog – and a Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark durante unison mai more loudly than Oscar barks bolla.

## 2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into a statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into a ball and fashions verso new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes verso part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by verso new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical puro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical to) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical sicuro \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By verso similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical sicuro both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants sopra quantified modal logic are preciso be handled exactly as they are durante first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced esatto affirm that distinct physical objects ancora time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The canone account is thus precedentemente facie incompatible with the natural ispirazione that constitution is identity.